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No war in recent memory has raged as long and intensely as the Cold War, 
permeating western and eastern hemispheres, expressing itself in long bouts of 
propaganda warfare and ideological hostility and pushing the world to the brink 
of nuclear holocaust. At the same time, no war has proven to be as multifaceted, 
insidious and all encompassing as the Cold War, transcending not just 
geographical boundaries but also the ideological and economic confines of 
diverse systems, and reflecting the profound structural weaknesses of the major 
superpowers. Symptomatic of this complex and tortuous conflict is the fact that 
no simple consensus exists as to when the Cold War started, why andbow it took 
shape, who was the major culprit, and what factors were most responsible for its 
emergence and persistence. In fact, the historiography of the Cold War is 
distinguished for its diversity of perspectives, its conflicting schools of thought, 
and its dynamic and provocative exchange of ideas between the traditional, 
orthodox school and the revisionist, New Left school.' 
You would not be aware of these dynamics and of a more complex 
understanding of the Cold War if you depended solely on the recent CNN Cold 
War documentary series. For Ted Turner's production is big on chronology, 
historical narrative and description while weak on analytical depth. The series 
comes as a slick, multimedia package consisting of 24 television episodes, a 
coffee-table book, and an extensive web-site. However, these accessories give us 
technological glitz at the expense of historical understanding. The documentary 
offers the latest in packaging, combining suspenseh1 music with a rich and 
unique archival collection of newsreel and film material. Indeed, much of the 
footage, never seen before, reveals personal portraits and inner intricacies which 
enrich this documentary. Moreover, some of the recent interviews, by engaging 
in frank discussions with leaders like Fidel Castro or George Bush, or in 
conversation with "ordinary" people of countries like the former USSR or Italy 
-important witnesses to history - lend substance to the Cold War saga. To the 
extent that this documentary excels in providing a comprehensive, 
chronological narrative of the Cold War, it can be used effectively in the 
undergraduate classroom not just as a source of factual information, but also as 
a point of departure for analysis and interpretation. At this point, however, the 
documentary quickly reaches its limits, for it is also small on controversy, 
diversity, complexity of interpretation, historical analysis, and criticism. In 
effect, the overall picture one gains of the Cold War is that of a highly simplified 
and sometimes Manichean struggle between the US and the USSR, between 
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good and evil, between the forces of democracy, in particular, American 
democracy, and those of communism, especially those most shaped by Stalin. 
With a couple of exceptions, it is as ifAmerican capitalism had little, if anything, 
to do with the Cold War, for the latter was primarily shaped by exaggerated 
responses of statesmen on both sides of the "iron curtain." For the most part, the 
US is characterized not as a selfish, self-interested, capitalist hegemon, but as a 
political superpower whose objectives were compatible with democracy and 
prosperity. The USSR, however, is pictured as a bite noir, especially under 
Stalin whose personality and ideology posed an unprecedented threat to the 
West, in particular to the US. 
The series starts out in grand form. It illuminates the beginning of the first 
nuclear age by showing in bold relief the overpowering images of a nuclear 
explosion with the familiar mushroom cloud followed by some grim images of 
death and destruction in Hiroshima. The year 1945 is used as a convenient point 
of departure because it was not only the end of one of the most destructive wars 
but also the beginning of another much longer and more costly struggle. In the 
process, however, the documentary greatly simplifies our understanding of the 
Cold War by spending a disproportionate amount of time on 1945 and after, 
while making it appear as if the years from 19 17 to 1945 had little to do with the 
final product. Out of 24 episodes, only one short part of the first episode is spent 
on the years from 1917 to 1945. In fact, the episode is mistakenly entitled 
"Comrades, 19 17- 1945," a misnomer, because, for most of those years, the US 
and the Soviet Union were not comrades, not even during the Grand Alliance of 
1941-45, which was an alliance of necessity and convenience, not one of 
genuine friendship. It is true that the CNN documentary makes references to 
1917 and the Bolshevik Revolution, the exclusion of Russians from the Paris 
Peace Conference, and the invasion of Russia by thousands of Allied (including 
US) troops who were there partly to challenge the Bolshevist forces. But the 
seminal role played by the US in contributing to the foundation of the Cold War 
through its diplomacy, its anti-Bolshevik ideology, its political and economic 
system, and its policies is not sufficiently illuminated, examined, and ~tressed.~ 
That the US refused to recognize Russia diplomatically from 19 17 to 1933 not 
only reflected official US hostility toward the new government and toward a new 
political and economic order, but also helped lay the basis for a new era of 
ideological division, intolerance, and misunderstanding and a new climate of 
domestic and international fear, repression, propaganda, and political 
polarization. Yet the diplomatic reality of non-recognition for sixteen years is 
never mentioned in the narration and only briefly discussed by George Kennan 
during an interview without any explanation of its profound consequences. 
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Moreover, the ideological values and the political and economic objectives 
reflected by such official isolation and exclusion are never brought to light and 
examined. On the contrary, no reference is made to how President Wilson's goal 
of a liberal, capitalist, international order appeared threatened by what Wilson 
himself called the "poison of Bolshevism" or of how fearful and fanatical his 
political colleagues like Secretary of State Lansing, or his own closest adviser, 
Colonel House, were about dealing with the "spectre" of Bolshevism and the 
epidemic proportions they believed it a s s ~ m e d . ~  To shed light on these 
characteristics is to illuminate the deep connections between the liberal, 
capitalist values and objectives of Americans and the deliberate pursuit of anti- 
Bolshevik politics that lay partly at the root of the Cold War. Nor is mention 
made of the virulent anti-communism and anti-radicalism. practiced 
domestically during the first so-called Red Scare from 1919 to 1920 when about 
250 alleged radicals were deported and when thousands of other alleged radicals 
were rounded up in raids sweeping the country. 
After 1920, with the defeat of the Democrats and the disillusionment of 
many Americans with World War I and US involvement abroad, US foreign 
policy, especially in Europe, changed its direction and emphasis, but its 
fundamental purpose and nature remained the same. CNN stresses the insular, 
inward-looking character of the US after World War I, pointing to a country that 
showed little interest in Europe or the Soviet Union until after Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt became President in 1933 and officially recognized the USSR. What 
it neglects to point out is the aggressively expansive economic and financial 
relations of the US with other countries throughout the world, including the 
USSR. For the 1920's was a decade in which the American economy and its 
financial investments expanded disproportionately, boding well for the US and 
many of its trading partners in the short run, but portentous of difficult times and 
grave imbalances in the world economy in the long rum4 Soviet-US relations, 
while often less intensely hostile during the Republicans' tenure than during 
Wilson's, continued on an antagonistic course. The Republican administrations 
extended Wilson's non-recognition policy but, at the same time, shipped food 
and medicine to a Russia plagued by famine and hard times, and encouraged 
businesses like General Electric and Ford Motor to enter the Soviet marketplace. 
This was symptomatic of an American capitalism so strong and expansive that it 
could transcend the narrow ideological confines of anti-Bolshevism. By the 
same token, the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression were 
findamentally responsible for the precipitous decline in trade and economic 
relations between the US and USSR, even after F.D.R. extended recognition to 
the USSR. 
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These overwhelming structural impediments, in conjunction with the 
shocking legacy of Stalinist rule in the 1930's, could not help but intensify the 
ever-growing anti-Bolshevist perspective of the US. This perspective could only 
diminish the prospects for co-operation and harmony between these allies 
during and after World War 11. Therefore, when circumstances and pressures 
combined to create further antagonism at the end of World War 11, this conflict 
would be greatly conditioned by the mutual suspicions, the ideological and 
economic incompatibility, and the deep sense of distrust that had already built 
up during the years between 1917 and 1941. It was this seminal foundation of 
Cold War tensions that the CNN documentary has failed to illuminate. 
Similarly, the CNN series has neglected to point out the myriad ways in 
which the US reinforced an4 at times, initiated Cold War tensions at the 
conclusion of and after World War 11. Conspicuously absent is a critique of the 
West's, specifically the US'S, inability and unwillingness to understand the 
security, geopolitical, economic and military concerns of the Soviets. In this 
regard, American arrogance was especially striking given the fact that the US 
had 434 military bases strewn throughout the world, a monopoly ofthe A-bomb, 
the world's largest navy and airforce, and a dynamically expanding economy, 
making it the wealthiest and most powerful nation on the planet. 
Well before the end of World War 11, the US made it difficult for the USSR 
to feel an integral part of the Grand Alliance. For the US withheld support for the 
second front until 1944, delayed or canceled promises of financial and military 
help, and refused to consult and include the Soviets genuinely as a partner in the 
deliberations on the post-war world. How was the USSR to behave as an ally 
when it was left to bear the brunt ofthe military losses on the western front - 27 
million - and was refused the financial assistance it required to begin the 
painful and costly task of reconstruction? The CNN series acknowledges the 
traumatic impact which the loss of 27 million soldiers and civilians had on the 
Soviet Union and its security needs, but the series neglects to clarify how this 
contributed to the tensions between East and West and to the makings of the 
post-World War I1 Cold War. Nor does it point out that in excluding the USSR 
from contributing to the deliberations on Italy during the armistice in 1943, the 
US and Great Britain set an ugly precedent for their own exclusion from the 
affairs of Eastern Europe in 1945 and thereafter. 
Even more important and ominous was America's detonation of the atomic 
bomb just as the Potsdam conference was opening and its dropping of the A- 
bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These actions also underscored American 
responsibility for the dawn and escalation of the nuclear arms race, something 
that would plague international relations from that point on while hrther 
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intensifying the Cold War. Substantive evidence suggests that the motives 
behind the use of the bomb were related not just to ending World War 11, but also 
to using atomic diplomacy as a powerful weapon against the Soviet U n i ~ n . ~  
After 1945, the US had viable options other than maintaining an atomic 
monopoly and extending its nuclear arsenal, but the record clearly shows that, as 
with so many other Cold War decisions, the US rejected constructive 
alternatives that might have changed both the course of the arms race and that of 
the Cold War. Interestingly enough, the CNN producers chose yet again not to 
illuminate these tarnished areas of American history. Nor did this series reveal 
the extent to which there was still choice and malleability in the foreign and 
domestic affairs of the US, opportunities that might still have had an impact 
upon the Cold War. 
In confronting what was the most contentious issue on the European 
continent after World War I1 - the future of Germany - the US clearly pursued 
its own economic and political interests while closing off more constructive 
possibilities of a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. For when "containment" 
was taken to mean preventing the Soviet Union from penetrating the West while 
allowing it to carry on unchallenged in its own sphere of influence and when the 
western powers, not the USSR, made the deliberate decision to divide Germany, 
the US and its western allies gave up on a historically unique opportunity to 
create a neutral, unified nation in Europe, one that might well have changed the 
course of the Cold War. At the same time, alternatives to containment and to 
pursuing the Cold War with the USSR were conveyed by American politicians as 
well as journalists. Henry Wallace, for example, Secretary of Commerce for a 
short time in the early Truman administration, offered a more conciliatory 
approach to the USSR, while journalists like ~ a l t e < ~ i ~ ~ m a n n  and, later on, I.F. 
Stone remained critical of the hard and inflexible course pursued by Truman and 
Eisenhower. Wallace paid for his criticism by being fired from his position, but 
he eventually ran for President as leader of the newly formed Progressive Party 
- a challenge not only to the Cold War consensus, but also to the two party 
system. Even though these critics were at first not successful, they persisted in 
their criticism which eventually helped shatter the Cold War consensus. 
Although very different political, economic, and social forces existed in 
Southeast Asia from those in central and eastern Europe, there can be no doubt 
about the fact that the course and outcome of the Cold War was not just 
contingent upon the communists in China, Korea, and Vietnam, but also 
dependent upon the policies and actions of the US. The efforts of Mao Tse Tung 
and Chou En Lai to communicate constructively with the US Government while 
the Chinese revolution was still raging, and to create an alternative to the 
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entrenched and predictable policy responses of the US vis-a-vis the Nationalists 
and the Communists, fell on deaf ears and blind eyes; they did suggest the 
potential for a modus vivendi between China and the US that might well have 
changed the dynamics of conflict and of the Cold War on that continent with a 
more accommodating and progressive response from the US.6 And the 
possibilities that existed between Ho Chi Minh and F.D.R. at a time when the US 
was critical of French colonial rule and had sympathetic leanings in the direction 
of the Vietminh also reveal the wide parameters within which relationships 
could still be fluid, flexible and accommodating.'That all ofthis crystallized and 
ossified in a few years was not just a reflection of the intensification of the Cold 
War along East-West lines but was also symptomatic of profound social and 
economic upheaval and various struggles of national liberation in the third world 
that were exacerbated by US intervention. Once American predilections and 
imperatives dictated an unprecedented leap toward militarization, as was 
evidenced by the Korean War, NSC-68, and the quadrupling of the American 
defense budget, the so-called die was cast, and it would be difficult from that 
point forward to escape the structural conditions that accompanied the rigorous 
prosecution of Cold War policy. 
In the world of CNN, however, little of this complex historical reality is 
conveyed. This is so not only because this overly ambitious but simplistic 
documentary spends far too little time dissecting the Chinese Revolution, the 
Korean War, and especially the War in Vietnam as struggles between peasant 
revolutionaries and colonial/imperialist elites rather than simply as a function of 
East-West, Cold War tension but also because its packaging of history does not 
reflect the historical controversies of past debates which brought to light much 
in American history still hidden from public view. To correct this structural flaw 
requires in part a wider, more comprehensive consultative process, involving the 
active participation of a number of revisionists as well as more traditional 
historians at every stage of production. But it also necessitates a willingness and 
a determination to dispense with political orthodoxy and conventional history 
and to illuminate historical truths by unraveling the historical controversies and 
findings of past and current debates. To do this might also involve transcending 
our cultural, political, and economic limitations and norms so that history can no 
longer by hijacked by those who stress form over substance, entertainment over 
education, suspense over accuracy, and the politically fashionable over 
historical truth and criticism. 
Benjamin D. Lowinsky 
York University 
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Scholars belonging to the traditional school of thought include Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 
Herbert Feis, Adam Ulam and Walt Rostow. Those who are known as revisionist, New 
Left scholars include William A. Williams, Walter LaFeber, Barton Bernstein, Lloyd 
Gardner, David Horowitz, Richard Barnet, Thomas McCormick, Gar Alperovitz, 
Thomas Paterson and Gabriel Kolko. They came to intellectual maturity during the 
1960's while the war in Vietnam and the Cold War were raging, and reflected the 
disillusionment and radical revisionism of many members of the protest movement, 
known as the New Left. Their opposition to the war in Vietnam was in part founded on 
their findamental critique of the U.S. contribution to the Cold War and on their 
criticism of the dysfunctional and reactionary nature of the U.S. economic and political 
system. The debate between these schools was dynamic and provocative not only 
because it reflected the deep cleavage of values and generations that characterized part 
of the tumultuous and polarizing politics of  the 1960's. Since then, it has never quite 
been the same, for, beginning in the 1970's and continuing on through to the 1990's, 
scholars have grasped in vain for a "post-revisionist synthesis." But such synthesis 
remained elusive because it could never replace traditional and revisionist perspectives, 
nor did it develop a point of view fundamentally different from either traditional or 
revisionist perspectives. 
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